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Abstract
The spokes model of nonlocalized spatial competition provides a new analytical tool
for di¤erentiated oligopoly and a representation of spatial monopolistic competition.
At the unique symmetric equilibrium of the spokes model, an increase in the number of
rms leads to lower prices when consumers have relatively high product valuations, but,
surprisingly, to higher prices for lower consumer valuations. New entry alters consumer
and social welfare through price, market expansion, and matching e¤ects. With free
entry, there can be multiple equilibria in the number of rms, the market may provide
too many or too few varieties from a social welfare perspective, and the equilibrium
price remains above marginal cost even when the number of rms is arbitrarily large.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The study of markets with di¤erentiated products is essential to understanding modern
economies. The economics literature on product di¤erentiation originates from the seminal
paper of Hotelling (1929). The Hotelling model considers a market with two stores located
symmetrically on a line, called the Main Street. Consumers are uniformly distributed on
the line and incur transportation costs to purchase from either store. Even though the two
rmsproducts are physically identical, they are di¤erentiated to consumers at di¤erent
locations due to the transportation costs. The Hotelling model has become a standard tool
in oligopoly analysis.
To understand oligopoly interactions under product di¤erentiation, it is important to
develop tractable models with more than two rms. The circle model (Salop, 1979) extends
the Hotelling model to allow an arbitrary number of di¤erentiated oligopoly rms, and has
proven to be an important tool for analyzing oligopoly markets. In symmetric equilibria of
the circle model, price decreases in the number of rms, approaching the marginal cost as
the number of rms gets large, and there is over-provision of varieties with free entry. Same
as the Hotelling formulation, the circle model follows a spatial approach where consumer
preferences (or product characteristics) are represented by addresses in a geographical (or
characteristic) space.1 A distinguishing feature of the circle model is that competition is
localized, in that a small change in a rms price only a¤ects its two neighbors, not the
rest of the rms. A drawback of the circle model is that symmetry requires incumbents to
relocate in product space when new rms enter the market.
Parallel to the development of models of localized competition are models of nonlocalized
competition, in the tradition of Chamberlin (1933). Under nonlocalized competition, each
rm competes against the market, and a price change by one rm a¤ects all other rms
(more or less) equally. Nonlocalized competition is clearly important for many industries,
and is becoming perhaps even more so with the developments of new trading institutions
1Lancaster (1966) pioneered the characteristics approach where goods are represented by points on some
characteristic space.
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such as the Internet. Studies of product di¤erentiation in the Chamberlinian tradition in-
clude the representative consumer model pioneered by Spence (1996) and Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), and the random utility model exemplied by Perlo¤ and Salop (1985). Following
a nonspatial approach, these studies have o¤ered new insights about prices and product
varieties in di¤erentiated-product industries. In particular, a market with nonlocalized
competition can provide either too few or too many varieties.
The literature on di¤erentiated product competition has focused on formalizing Cham-
berlins concept of monopolistic competition by examining free entry equilibria in the limit
as the number of competitors becomes arbitrarily large. In monopolistic competition, rms
exercise market power, i.e. set price above marginal cost, while earning zero prots. With
free entry into the market, the number of competitors increases either as the size of the
market grows larger or as the xed cost of market competition becomes smaller. Monopo-
listic competition holds in the limit if, as in Hart (1985a, 1985b), consumers care about only
a limited number of product varieties,2 or if the product space is unbounded and available
product varieties are never close substitutes. These conditions ensure that, when each rm
is negligibly small in the limiting market, the demand for a rms product is not innitely
elastic.3
Despite the many important developments in the economics literature on product dif-
ferentiation,4 oligopoly competition with product di¤erentiation has not been studied in a
spatial model with nonlocalized competition. The spatial approach is attractive for oligopoly
analysis, because it is based on a denite and easy to visualize physical foundation. In
the present paper, we introduce the "spokes model" of non-localized spatial competition as
2This assumption has been justied by Wolinsky (1986) as arising from consumersimperfect information
about di¤erent brands.
3 In the circle model, when the number of rms approaches innite, the distance between any two rms
approaches zero. In the random utility model of Perlo¤ and Salop, when the random utility of each consumer
is bounded, the di¤erence between a consumers utilities from her rst and second most preferred brands
approaches zero when the number of brands approaches innite. In both cases the demand elasticity for
each rm approaches innite at the limit.
4See Eaton and Lipsey (1989) and Anderson et al (1992) for excellent reviews of the literature.
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a tool for oligopoly analysis. The spokes model extends the classical Hotelling duopoly
model to allow for arbitrary numbers of possible product varieties and of rms, and has the
following structure. Starting at the midpoint (center) of a line of unit length, add lines of
one-half length to form a radial network of N ( 2) lines (spokes). Each spoke (denoted as
li) terminates at the center and originates at the other end. There are i = 1; 2; :::; N distinct
possible varieties of a product, with variety i located at the origin of spoke i: There are n
( N) rms, each producing a single variety (or brand). The brands are physically identical
but are di¤erentiated by their di¤erent locations. Consumers are uniformly distributed on
the network of spokes. A consumer travels to a rm in order to purchase the rms brand,
and incurs transportation costs (or, alternatively, utility losses due to imperfect preference
matching). For a consumer located on li; brand i is her rst preferred brand (or local
brand), and each of the other N   1 brands is equally likely to be her second preferred
brand. The consumer has value v for one unit of either her rst or second preferred brands,
and zero value for additional units or for other brands. The Hotelling model is a special
case with N = n = 2:5
The spokes model is a special case of Harts (1985a) general model of monopolistic com-
petition, and inherits several attractive features that distinguish it from the circle model of
spatial competition (Salop, 1979). First, the model maintains symmetry between all brands
and between all rms without the need to change the locations of incumbents as new rms
enter the market. Second, each rm is in direct competition with all other rms, even
though each consumer is only interested in a xed number of possible varieties.6 Third,
total output in the market is not xed but depends on equilibrium prices and the num-
5A variant of the spokes model was initially suggested in Chen and Riordan (2003), in order to study
how downstream market structure mattered for the competitive consequences of vertical integration and
exclusive contracts. In that model, rms observe consumers locations and deliver goods to consumers
at individualized delivery prices; and it is thus not an extension of the standard Hotelling model where
consumerslocations are not known.
6Our assumption that each consumer is only interested in two brands is obviously restrictive and is made
mainly for tractability. We shall later discuss a possible motivation for this assumption based on consumers
imperfect information, as well as possible ways to relax this assumption.
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ber of rms. Consequently, the new entry in the spokes model has a market expansion
e¤ect. Fourth, the model approximates monopolistic competition in the limit as N ! 1
and n = kN for some xed 0 < k  1. Hart (1985a, 1985b) focuses on the limiting case
of monopolistic competition. The additional structure of the spokes model allows a more
detailed analysis of the e¤ect of new entry on market conduct and performance away from
the limit when N is nite. While other analyses of di¤erentiated oligopoly do likewise
(see, for example, Sattinger, 1984; and Anderson, dePalma, and Thisse, 1992), our spatial
approach is novel and o¤ers interesting, and at times surprising, new insights.
We use the model to reexamine core economic questions about di¤erentiated product
markets: How does price competition depend on market structure? What are the e¤ects
of new product entry on competition and welfare? Does the market provide too few or
too many product varieties compared to the social optimum? And what properties hold
when rms are small relative to the size of the market? Our analysis reveals intriguing
relationships between market structure and equilibrium price: an increase in the number of
rms reduce price if consumers value products highly, but raises price if consumer value is
in an intermediate range. Consequently, rm prot can be non-monotonic in the number of
competitors. New entry alters consumer and social welfare through price, market expansion,
and matching e¤ects. As with other models on nonlocalized competition, the number of
product varieties can be either socially excessive or decient. In the spokes model entry
tends to be excessive (decient) when entry cost is relatively low (high), and excessive or
decient entry can arise for the same set of parameter values due to multiple free-entry
equilibria. Finally, the spokes model with free entry provides a representation of spatial
monopolistic competition as the number of competitors becomes arbitrarily large, with
interesting welfare properties of equilibrium in the limit.
Our result that equilibrium price can increase with entry is unusual,7 and it has the
7Perlo¤, Suslow, and Sequin (2005) demonstrate a similar result in a spatial model comparing monopoly
and duopoly. Other oligopoly models in which price rises with more rms are based on imperfect consumer
information (e.g., Satterthwaite, 1979; Schulz and Stahl, 1996; and Stiglitz, 1987), or mixed-strategy pricing
(e.g., Rosenthal, 1980). Our result is obtained under perfect information and with pure strategies.
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following intuition. In equilibrium, each symmetrically positioned rm views itself as
competing in a number of submarkets. The submarkets are distinguished by whether
consumersrst and second preferred brands are available. In some submarkets, consumers
lack an alternatively available brand and the rm is e¤ectively a monopolist. In other
submarkets, the rm is a duopolist competing with an alternative brand. A key property
of the spokes model is that the price elasticity of demand can be lower in the monopoly
submarkets than in duopoly submarkets.8 Therefore, rms prefer a lower price in the
monopoly submarkets, but, unable to discriminate, settle on a compromise price. The
e¤ect of new entry is to convert some monopoly submarkets into duopolies. This changes
the compromise, and gives rms an incentive to raise price. This intuition shows that price-
increasing entry depends on a particular ranking of elasticities across market structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and
derives each rms demand function. Section 3 characterizes the unique (symmetric) equi-
librium of the model for a given number of rms. The equilibrium price exhibits di¤erent
properties corresponding to four mutually exclusive and connected regions of parameter
values. Comparative static analysis of equilibrium shows how a change in the number of
rms a¤ects price, prots, and consumer welfare. Section 4 endogenizes the number of
rms in a free-entry equilibrium, and shows that the free entry number of rms may exceed
or fall short of the socially optimal number depending on parameter values, and, in some
cases, on equilibrium selection. Section 5 studies monopolistic competition by examining
the properties of the model when there is an arbitrarily large number of possible varieties
and proportionally large number of rms. Section 6 concludes.
2. SPOKES MODEL
There are i = 1; 2; :::; N possible varieties of a di¤erentiated product. Each variety (brand)
is represented by a point that is the origin of a line with its length being 12 : The other end of
the line is called its terminal. For variety i; its associated line is called li; and the terminals
8This generalizes a property of the Hotelling model (Chen and Riordan, 2004).
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of all the lines meet at one point, called the center. This forms a radial network of lines
(spokes network) connected at the center, and this network represents the preference space.
There are j = 1; 2; :::; n rms in the market, 2  n  N: Firm j is located at the origin
of lj and produces variety j with constant marginal cost: For expositional simplicity, this
variable production cost is normalized to zero; thus all values in the model are interpreted
to be net of production costs. Each rm produces only one variety and posts a single price.
Firms set prices simultaneously.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the spokes network, and the total mass of con-
sumers is normalized to unity. A consumers location (ideal point) on the network is fully
characterized by a vector (li; xi); meaning that the consumer is on li at a distance xi to
variety i (the origin of li):9 Since all the other varieties are symmetric, the distance from
consumer (li; xi) to any variety i0, i0 6= i; is 12  xi+ 12 = 1 xi: Any consumer must travel on
the spokes to reach any rm (variety) where she wishes to purchase the product, incurring
positive transportation costs: The unit transportation cost, t; is normalized to unity; thus
all values in the model are expressed in transportation cost units. Variety i is consumer
(li; xi)
0s rst preferred brand (or local brand), of which her valuation for one unit is v; she
also has a second preferred brand, which is any i0 6= i chosen by nature with probability
1
N 1; and of which her valuation for one unit is also v: The consumer places zero value on
the brand that is not one of her two desired brands,10 as well as on any additional units of
any brand.
We notice immediately the following:
Remark 1 The spokes model reduces to the Hotelling model when N = n = 2:
We derive the demand for rm j for any given price prole (p1; p2; :::; pn):There are three
relevant categories of consumers: consumers for whom brand j is preferred, and whose
two preferred brands are both available; consumers for whom brand j is the rst preferred






; and therefore every consumers location
representation is unique.
10We discuss later about the motivation for this assumption and how it can be relaxed without changing
the results of our analysis.
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brand, whose second preferred brand is not available; and consumers whose rst brand is
unavailable and for whom brand j is the second preferred brand.
For any consumer located on lj or on lk; denoted as (lj ; xj) or (lk; xk); for j; k 2 f1; :::; ng;
both variety j and variety k are her desired brands with conditional probability 1N 1 : Such
a consumer is indi¤erent between variety j and k if pj+xj = pk+(1 xj) or pj+(1 xk) =



































where 2N is the density of consumers on lj and on lk:
For any consumer on lj; with probability 1N 1 variety i is her second preferred brand
where i =2 f1; :::; ng: Such a consumer prefers purchasing from rm j to no purchase if





minfmaxf0; v   pjg; 1
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g;
where 2N is again the density of consumers on lj ; and N   n varieties are unavailable.
Finally, for any consumer on li; i 6= j and i =2 f1; :::; ng; variety j is her second pre-
ferred brand with probability 1N 1 : Such a consumer prefers purchasing from rm j to not
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N if v   pj > 1
: (1)
Thus, rm j essentially sells to two consumer groups: consumers who have an alternative
available, and those who do not. The rm, however, cannot price discriminate between the
two consumer groups.
A restrictive assumption of the spokes model is that each consumer only cares about two
possible brands, although the two desired brands di¤er for di¤erent consumers. This is a
special case of Harts (1985) restriction that each consumer cares only about a xed nite
number of possible varieties. It is a tractable way to introduce nonlocalized competition in
a spatial setting. One possible motivation for the assumption, following Wolinsky (1986),
is consumersimperfect information. For instance, if the consumer has perfect information
about her local brand but must search to nd information about any other brand, and if she
has zero cost for her rst search but has a su¢ ciently high cost for any additional search,
then she e¤ectively will be interested only in her local brand and another randomly chosen
brand even if other brands are also desirable.11
The purpose of the restriction is to assure the existence of a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in prices with a minimum of fuss. For example, suppose alternatively that
consumer (li; xi) valued equally all varieties other than variety i. Then there would be a
discontinuity in rm is demand curve that would undermine a pure strategy equilibrium.
There are various ways to extend the model to relax the assumption and still deal with
the existence problem. For example, suppose that each consumer has a randomly selected
third preferred brand valued at v3 < v 1, fourth preferred brand valued at v4  v3, and so
on. Consumer (li; xi) travels distance (1 xi) to purchase any of these lower-ranked brands,
the same as if she purchases her second preferred brand. This formulation is similar to
the model of Deneckere and Rothchild (1992), except that here the intensity of consumer
11 In their symmetric random utility model, Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) have also suggested that consumers
may have imperfect information about the availability of competing brands, which can lead to a situation
where every rm competes with every rm else but for di¤erent consumers, as in the spokes model here.
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preferences over di¤erent brands is heterogeneous. If v3 < p, where p is the equilibrium
price, then the consumer only cares about two varieties in equilibrium, and all of our results
remain true.
3. PRICE
Given the symmetry of the model, we focus on symmetric Bertrand-Nash (pure strategy)
equilibria in which all rms set the same price p, serve an equal number of consumers q,
and earn the same amount of prot  = pq (recalling cost is normalized to zero): We
assume:




2N   n  1
N   n  v(N;n): (2)
If v > v(N;n), then a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium does not exist;12 and, if v < 1,
then rms e¤ectively are independent monopolists. The equilibrium price is a continuous
function of v; corresponding to four regions of the assumed parameter space. The regions
are distinguished by the prevailing pattern of consumer demand, in particular, the extent to
which consumers whose desired brands are available actually make a purchase and obtain
a positive surplus in equilibrium. We have:







n 1 < v  v(N;n) (Region I)






2N n 1 < v < 2 (Region III)
v   12 if 1  v  12 + N 12N n 1 (Region IV)
: (3)
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. Figure 1 illustrates how p depends on
v over the four regions. Region I corresponds to "normal" oligopoly competition. All
consumers whose desired brands are available purchase and enjoy a strictly positive sur-
plus in equilibrium. Price is forced down by competition for consumers with a rst and
12For any given N  3; v(N;n) is a convex function of n and reaches its minimum at n = 2N+1
3
; and thus
v(N;n)  v(N; 2N+1
3
) = 5: Notice also that v(N;n) =1 when n = N:
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second choice of available brands. Consequently, p depends on n and N , but not on
v. In Region II, rms focus on monopolizing consumers who lack a second choice. All
consumers whose desired brands are available again purchase, but the marginal consumer
is indi¤erent between purchasing her second desired brand and purchasing nothing. Thus
each rms demand curve has a kink at p = v   1, which fully extracts the surplus of
the marginal consumer, and therefore rises linearly with v. In Region III, rms sell to both
consumers who have a choice (the duopoly submarket) and those who do not (the monopoly
submarket). The marginal consumer in the duopoly submarket is indi¤erent between two
available varieties and gains a strictly positive surplus, while the marginal consumer in the
monopoly submarket is indi¤erent between purchasing her second preferred variety and not
purchasing at all. An increase in v motivates each rm to raise price in order to further
exploit consumers in the monopoly submarket, and thus p rises with v: This region has
the unusual property that equilibrium demand is more elastic in the monopoly submarket,
implying that price increases with entry, as discussed further below. Finally, Region IV cor-
responds to a di¤erent kind of "kinked" equilibrium. All consumers whose rst preferred
variety is available, and only these consumers, purchase the product, with the marginal
consumer indi¤erent between purchasing and not. Again p does not depend on n and N ,
and increases linearly with v.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]







(n 1)2 < 0 if Region I
0 if Region II
2 (N 1)(2 v)
(3n 4N+1)2 > 0 if Region III
0 if Region IV
: (4)
A change in market concentration has a mixed e¤ect on price across the regions of the
parameter space: it is weakly decreasing in n for v  2 but weakly increasing in n for
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v < 2. In Region I, where v is high, an increase in n has the familiar e¤ect of lowering
equilibrium prices, due to increased competition. For Regions II and IV, where the demand
is kinked, p is una¤ected by the small changes in n, due to a discontinuity in the marginal
prot function. What is most surprising is that p is strictly increasing in n in Region III:
This is very di¤erent from the result in the circle model. While there are other oligopoly
models in which price rises with more rms, these models rely either on imperfect consumer
information (e.g., Satterthwaite, 1979; Schulz and Stahl, 1996; and Stiglitz, 1987) or on
mixed strategy equilibrium in prices (e.g., Rosenthal, 1980). Our striking result is obtained
under complete information and with pure strategies, and it has a novel economic intuition:
In Region III of parameter values, each rm continues to sell to two segments of consumers,
those it competes for against other rms (the competitive segment) and those for whom
it provides the only desirable variety (the monopoly segment). It turns out, however,
that demand is more elastic for the monopoly segment than for the competitive segment.
This property is due to the fact that, as the rm lowers its price, the marginal consumer
in the monopoly segment always has zero surplus from the alternative (not purchasing)
while the marginal consumer in the competitive segment becomes increasingly attracted to
the alternative (closer to the competing brands). As the number of rms becomes higher,
the monopoly segment shrinks and the competitive segment expands, reducing the overall
demand elasticity. This leads to a higher market price.
It is also interesting that changes in n can change equilibrium prices by changing the
nature of the equilibrium, i.e. by shifting the equilibrium from one region to another. For
instance, an increase in n can shift the equilibrium from Region II to Region I, decreasing
the equilibrium price from v   1 to 2N 1n 1   1. On the other hand, an increase in n can
shift the equilibrium from Region IV to Region III, resulting in a higher price.13
If an increase in n leads to lower prices, then it benets consumers. On the other hand,
an increase in n that leads to higher prices does not necessarily mean consumers are worse
13 If unit transportation cost t were not normalized to 1, the equilibrium price would be v  t in Region II
and v   t
2
in Region IV, and an increase in t would lower price in these two regions. This "perverse" e¤ect
of t in kinked equilibria is similar to that of the circle model (Salop, 1979).
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o¤, because it also increases the available product varieties, which has the positive market
expansion and matching e¤ects. Generally, an increase in n a¤ects consumers in three ways:
 Market expansion e¤ect: An increase in available varieties enables some consumers
whose desired brands were previously unavailable to obtain a positive surplus.
 Price e¤ect: Depending on the value of v; an increase in n can either reduce, increase
or have no e¤ect on equilibrium prices.
 Matching e¤ect: Some consumers previously consuming their second choice, are able
to consumer their rst choice.
Equilibrium prot is calculated easily from Proposition 1 and equilibrium demand:




(n 1)(N 1)N if Region I
(v   1) 2N n 1(N 1)N if Region II
(2(N n)v+(n 1))2(2N n 1)




N if Region IV
: (5)
Furthermore,  decreases in n for v  2 (Regions I and II); but  may either decrease or
increase in n if 12 +
N 1
2N n 1 < v < 2 (Region III).
The unusual result that prots can be non-monotonic in the number of rms is a conse-
quence of price-increasing entry. In Region III, an increase in n raises equilibrium price,
but reduces each rms output since some consumers switch to purchase from new entrants.
If v is relatively large in Region III, then each rm sells to most consumers in its monopoly
submarkets. Consequently, the rm experiences a large decrease in output when an increase
in n converts some of these submarkets to duopolies, even though price increases, and 
decreases in n: But if v is relatively small, the output e¤ect dominates when n is small and
the price e¤ect dominates when n is large, resulting in a U-shaped curve, as demonstrated
with the following example:
12




2N n 1 < v < 2; and
 =
(2 (N   n) v + (n  1))2 (2N   n  1)
(4N   3n  1)2 (N   1)N =
(2n  59)2 (39  n)






6n2   297n+ 3179 (2n  59)
380 (79  3n)3 ;





10 (3n  79)4 > 0:
Since @

@n = 0 when n = 15: 654; which is the solution to
6n2   297n+ 3179 = 0;
 decreases for n  15 and increases for n  16:
4. VARIETY
The performance of markets under product di¤erentiation depends not only on the equi-
librium price, but also on the variety of products available in the market. The spokes model
o¤ers an interesting setting to investigate the issue of whether and how the variety provided
by the market in equilibrium di¤ers from the socially optimal level. Unlike the circle model,
the spokes model has the desirable feature that as the number of rms increases, the sym-
metry of the model is maintained without the need to change the locations of the incumbent
rms. In addition, there is a market expansion e¤ect with the entry of new rms, namely
some consumes who were not purchasers before will now consume the product, which is
not present in the circle model or in the representative consumer model. Furthermore, the
e¤ect of entry or exit on market performance depends on the relationships between v, N ,
and n; the equilibrium number of rms (as determined by xed cost).
Suppose that there are many identical potential rms who can enter to produce a brand
by incurring a xed entry cost f > 0. If n rms enter, then each earns prots  (n) as
characterized in Corollary 2. In a "free entry equilibrim", there are n active rms satisfying
 (n)  f   (n + 1)
13
if n < N , or  (n)  f if n = N .
We separately consider two cases. Case A corresponds to combined Regions I and II of
the parameter space, and Case B to Regions III and IV. For convenience we sometimes
treat n as a continuous variable, in which case we use the notation [n]  to denote the largest
integer smaller than n, and [n]+ the smallest integer larger than n.
The reader can skip to Section 5 on monopolistic competition without much loss of
continuity. Monopolistic competition provides a simpler framework for evaluating free-
entry equilibria, with similar results.




 fN  2N   3
N   1 (v   1): (6)
The rst inequality in this assumption ensures that the constraint n  N is not binding for
the socially optimal number of rms, and the second inequality ensures that a free-entry
equilibrium can support at least two active rms (see Lemma 1 in the appendix).
By Corollary 2,  decreases in n for the relevant parameter space for Case A. Therefore
if ~n  2 satises
 (~n) = f;
then the unique free-entry equilibrium has
n = [~n] 
rms.
In order to characterize the free entry equilibrium further, we need some additional no-
tation. Dene





(2N   n^  1)2
(n^  1) (N   1)N :
14
Then n^ is the critical value of n that divides the parameter space between Region I and II,
and f^ is the corresponding value of f dened by the zero prot condition at this boundary
point. Substituting n^ into f^ ; we obtain
f^ =
 
2N    1 + 2N 1v   12 
1 + 2N 1v   1





Thus f^N > 1 if v > 2. For fN  f^N , Region I is relevant, and for 12  fN < 1 the
constraint n  N will be binding and hence n = N ; for 1  fN  f^N the zero prot
condition is satised at
n1 = 2N   1  N   1
2
p
fN (fN + 8)  fN

: (7)
Similarly, the zero prot condition in Region II is satised at
n2 = 2N   1  fN (N   1)
v   1 : (8)
The next proposition, which provides a complete characterization of n and is proved for-
mally in the appendix, establishes that Region I is the relevant region of the parameter
space at a free-entry equilibrium for lower values of f , and Region II is relevant for higher
values.
Proposition 2 The number of rms in a free-entry equilibrium is
n =
8>>><>>>:
N if 12  fN < 1
[n1]
  if 1  fN  f^N
[n2]
  if f^N < fN  2N 3N 1 (v   1)
; (9)
assuming 2  v  v(N;n).
We next compare the free-entry number of rms with the number that maximizes social
surplus (social welfare), no. Since 2  v  v(N;n); all consumers whose desired brands
are available are served in a free-entry equilibrium. This means that social surplus cannot
be increased by changing rmsprices, and any potential distortion in a market equilibrium
comes from the possible distortion in the number of rms.
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Accordingly, we compute the socially optimal number of rms under the assumption that
available brands are allocated to consumers e¢ ciently. With n rms, consumers on the n













where 2N is the consumer density on each spoke. For consumers on the remaining (N   n)
spokes, whose rst preferred variety is unavailable, each consumer is served by each of the

















Adding up, the social welfare with n rms is:
W (n) =
(4 (N   n) v + 4 (N   1) (v   1) + 3 (n  1))n
4 (N   1)N   fn:
We have:
W 0(n) =  4v   1 + 4N   8Nv   6n+ 8nv
4 (N   1)N   f
and
W 00(n) =   (4v   3)
2 (N   1)N < 0:




  (2fN   1) (N   1)
4v   3 : (10)
We note that nw < N when fN  12 : Furthermore, it is straightforward that nw > 1 if
v  2 and N  2. If nw happens to be integer, then no = nw is the socially optimal number
of rms. Otherwise, either no = [nw]  or no = [nw]+ by the concavity of W (n).
The following table calculates pairs of (n; no) for various parameter congurations. An
entry of "X" indicates that either n or no is less than 2.
TABLE 1: Equilibrium vs. socially optimal number of rms: (n; no)
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fN = 1 1:5 2 3 4 5 6 7 7.58
N v = 2 10, 8 5, 6 X, 4 X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X
= v = 3 10, 9 8, 8 7, 7 5, 5 X, 3 X, X X, X X, X X, X
10 v = 4 10, 9 8, 8 7, 7 6, 6 5, 5 4, 3 X, 2 X, X X, X
v = 5 10, 9 8, 8 7, 8 6, 7 5, 6 5, 5 4, 4 3, 3 X, 2
N v = 2 15, 12 8, 9 X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X
= v = 3 15, 13 13, 11 11, 10 8, 7 X, 4 X, X X, X X, X X, X
15 v = 4 15, 13 13, 12 11, 11 9, 9 8, 7 5, 5 X, 3 X, X X, X
v = 5 15, 14 13, 13 11, 12 9, 10 8, 9 7, 6 6, 5 4, 4 2, 3
N v = 2 20, 16 10, 12 X, 8 X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X
= v = 3 20, 17 17, 15 15, 13 10, 9 X, 5 X, X X, X X, X X, X
20 v = 4 20, 18 17, 17 15, 15 12, 12 11, 9 7, 6 X, 3 X, X X, X
v = 5 20, 18 17, 17 15, 16 12, 14 11, 12 9, 9 6, 5 4, 4 2, 4
The table has several noteworthy features.
 First and foremost, the socially optimal number of rms can be greater than, equal
to, or less than the equilibrium number depending on parameter values.
 Second, free entry tends to be excessive when fN is small14, and decient when fN is
large.15 The entry of an additional rm has the negative externality of reducing each
incumbent rms prot, but also has the positive externality of increasing consumer
surplus through the market expansion and the matching e¤ects. For given N; fN
being small or large is the same as f being small or large. Thus, when f is small,
the negative externality on prots is more likely to dominate; otherwise, the positive
externality from the market expansion and matching e¤ects tends to dominate.
 Third, the relationship between n and no is not monotonic in fN (or in f for xed
N): It can be readily veried that n1   nw is U-shaped as fN increases, and n2   nw
14A su¢ cient condition for n > no is 1
2N
< f  1:
15When fN = 2N 3
N 1 (v   1) ; n2 = 2 but nw > 2 if in addition v < N2 + 18 : Notice that in Table 1 v < N2 + 18
since N  10 and v  5:
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decreases as fN increases. Therefore, when fN is small and the equilibrium falls
within Region I, n > no initially but the opposite can be true for some intermediate
values of fN:
 Fourth, for the same N and fN; as v increases, n remains the same if the nature
of equilibrium does not change but can increase if the equilibrium switches from
Region II to Region I; and no weakly increases. As a result, it is possible that the
entry equilibrium changes from being excessive to being decient, or vice versa, as v
increases.
4.2 Case B: 1  v < 2












N if 1  v  12 + N 12N n 1 (Region IV)
;
and  (n) is continuous: Notice that 12 +
N 1
2N n 1 2 (1; 32 ] increases in n and is equal to 32
when n = N: Thus, if v 2 [1; 32); as n increases from 2 to N; it is possible that the relevant
region for  is rst in Region III and then in Region IV. If v  32 ; the relevant region for
 is always Region III.
The analysis of free-entry equilibria for this case is complicated by the possibility of
multiple equilibria, due to the possibility that  is U-shaped in n in Region III. For given
f > 0 that is not too large; n is a free-entry equilibrium if it satises one of the two
conditions below:
1.  () is decreasing; and  (n)  f   (n + 1) for n < N; or  (n)  f for
n = N:
2.  (z) = f for some z  N and  (n) is weakly increasing for n  z with
n = argmax f (n)  fn : z  n  Ng :
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Obviously, if  (n) is non-monotonic in n; both conditions can potentially be satised
by di¤erent values of n.
Since in equilibrium not all consumers are served, the prices in the market equilibrium
are not e¢ cient. This complicates the determination of the socially optimal number of
varieties; since one needs to consider whether prices are set e¢ ciently (at marginal cost).
Suppose that a social planner sets the price e¢ ciently, then the socially optimal (the rst-
best) number of varieties is the same as before and is no = [nw]  or [nw]+ ; where nw is
given by equation (10) earlier.
Suppose next that the social planner can regulate entry but not rm prices (i.e., the
second-best solution). Then with n rms, consumers on the n spokes receive their most













For consumers on the remaining (N   n) spokes, whose rst preferred variety is unavailable,
if the parameter values are in Region III, then (v   p) consumers on each of the (N   n)
spokes is served by each of the n rms with probability 1N 1 ; and the social surplus from













(4N   n+ 2v   4Nv + 2nv   3) (4N   5n+ 2v   12Nv + 10nv + 1) (N   n)n
(3n  4N + 1)2 (N   1)N :
If, on the other hand, the parameter values are in Region IV, then none of the consumers
on the (N   n) spokes is served.























The second-best number of varieties is integer ~no that maximizes ~W (n); and ~no can be
computed numerically.
In Table 2, we list for selected parameter values the equilibrium number of rms, the
rst-best number of rms, and the second-best number of rms, (n; no; ~no) : When n can
take multiple values, the vector of n is entered. A number that is less than 2 is denoted
with X.
TABLE 2: Equilibrium vs. Socially Optimal Number of Firms: (n; no; ~no)
fN = 0:74 0:76 0:96 1:1 1:2 1:4
N v = 54
4
10
; 7, 10 2, 7, 10 X, 5, 4 X, 4, 2 X, 3, X X, X, X
= v = 64 10, 8, 10 8, 8, 10
5
10
; 7, 10 X, 6, 10 X, 5, 10 X, 4, X
10 v = 74 10, 8, 10 10, 8, 10 10, 7, 10 7, 7, 10 5, 6, 10 2, 5, 10






, 11, 15 X, 8, 6 X, 6, 2 X, 5, X X, 2, X
= v = 64 15, 12, 15 15, 12, 15
8
15
; 10, 15 X, 9, 9 X, 8, 7 X, 6, 4
15 v = 74 15, 13, 15 15, 13, 15 15, 11, 12 10, 10, 11 8, 10, 10 3, 8, 8
N v = 54
7
20
; 15, 20 3, 15, 20 X, 11, 8 X, 8, 3 X, 6, X X, 2, X
= v = 64 20, 16, 20 20, 16, 20
10
20
; 14, 20 2, 12, 12 X, 11, 10 X, 8, 6
20 v = 74 20, 17, 20 20, 17, 20 20, 15, 17 14, 14, 15 10, 13, 13 4, 11, 11
Table 2 has the following notable features:
 The socially optimal number of rms, whether in the sense of rst- or second-best, can
be greater than, equal to, or less than the equilibrium number depending on parameter
values. This can happen whether or not the free entry equilibrium is unique.
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 Relative to the rst best, free entry tends to be excessive when fN is small and
decient when fN is large. This is similar to the result in Case A. Relative to
the second best, however, free entry tends to be decient except possibly for some
intermediate values of fN:
 For the same N and fN; as v increases, both n and no weakly increase, as in Case
A; but the second best number ~no can occasionally decrease, possibly due to the fact
that price increases with n in Region III.
 If fN is relatively small and/or v is relatively large (close to 2), the second best
number of rms tends to exceed the rst best number; otherwise the opposite tends
to be true. This may be due to the fact that under the second best price is too high
and output is too low, which makes it more desirable to correct through more entry
if fN is relatively small and/or v is relatively large.
4.3 Discussion
Deneckere and Rothschild (1985) suggest that markets tend to provide too many varieties
under localized competition but not enough under nonlocalized competition. Our analy-
sis indicates that the relationship between the nature of competition and entry is more
complicated. In the spokes model, with nonlocalized competition, both under- and over-
provision of product varieties are possible. This can happen for di¤erent parameter values,
but sometimes also for the same parameter value due to the multiplicity of equilibria.
Our analysis further sheds light on when free entry is likely to be excessive or decient. In
both Case A and Case B, compared to the rst best, free entry tends to be excessive when
fN is small and decient when fN is large. When entry cost is relatively low and/or post-
entry prot is relatively high (fN is small), the business stealing e¤ect tends to dominate the
consumer surplus e¤ect of entry associated with market expansion and improved product
matching; and otherwise the business stealing e¤ect tends to be dominated by the consumer
surplus e¤ect. Interestingly, decient entry can also occur here because there are multiple
equilibria and the market becomes trapped in a low-level equilibrium. If entry were
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sequential rather than simultaneous, then a "bandwagon" would eliminate such decient
entry equilibrium.
5. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
We consider monopolistic competition with the spokes model by examining the limiting
behavior of the market when the number of rms (n) is large. Since our model involves both
N and n, we need to dene what we mean by n ! 1: Following Hart (1985), we assume
n = kN , for a xed parameter k 2 (0; 1], and let N !1. We interpret this to mean that,
as the number of possible varieties (N) increases, the xed costs of market participation (f)
decline appropriately to keep the free entry number of rms (n) in xed proportion to N .
In order to apply the results from Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 in this limit, we assume
v c
t 2 [1; 2k + 12 2 k1 k ).
Hart (1985a, 1985b) argues that market power is key condition of true monopolistic
competition. The following proposition establishes that, in the limit, as the market becomes
unconcentrated, price in the spokes model remains bounded above zero, indicating that
rms retain market power. Therefore, the spokes model provides a spatial representation
of monopolistic competition. In fact, the spoke model of monopolistic competition is a
special case of Harts general model (Hart, 1985a).






k < v  2k + 12 2 k1 k (Region I)






2 k < v < 2 (Region III)
v   12 if 1  v  12 + 12 k (Region IV)
: (12)
As N ! 1;  ! 0: But using Corollary 2, it is straightforward to show that N
converges to a positive limit.
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Corollary 3 If n = kN and N !1, then
N ! R(v; k) 
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(2 k)2
k if Region I
(v   1) (2  k) if Region II
(2(1 k)v+k)2(2 k)





In Regions I, II, and IV, the limiting value of N is decreasing in k. In Region III,
however, the limiting value of N is a convex function of k with a minimum at







12v   5v2   4  6

;






In monopolistic competition the free entry zero-prot condition holds exactly at an inte-
rior equilibrium value of k, provided that in the limit N decreases in k. If n = kN in
equilibrium, then it must be that limN!1 f ! 0; and
lim
N!1
fN = R(v; k) (14)
if 0 < k < 1. This is a su¢ cient condition for a monopolistically competitive equilibrium in
Regions I, II, and IV, while Region III requires the additional condition that k < K (v) to
insure that further entry decreases prots. The model also admits monopolistically com-
petitive equilibria with k = 1 and R(v; k) > limN!1 fN ; in this case, even monopolistically
competitive rms make positive prots, because there is no "room" in product space for
further entry. Our analysis below focuses only on monopolistically competitive equilibria
satisfying the zero prot condition (14).
We next use the zero prot condition to characterize the welfare properties of monopolistic
competition. Recall from Section 4 that, ignoring integer constraints, welfare optimizing




  (2fN   1) (N   1)







taking limits, and imposing the zero prot condition yields the following comparison of the
socially optimal and equilibrium number of rms in monopolistic competition.
Proposition 4 If  = f , n = kN; and N !1, then
kw   k !
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1  k   2(2 k)2 k(4v 3)k in Region I
1  k   (2(v 1)(2 k) 1)4v 3 in Region II
1  k   2[2v k(2v 1)]2(2 k) (4 3k)2
(4v 3)(4 3k)2 in Region III if k < K(v)
1  k   2(v 1)4v 3 in Region IV
; (16)
The proposition is summarized in Figure 2. The solid lines mark the boundaries of
the four regions in (v; k), with "X" indicating regions in which a pure strategy equilibrium
does not exist in the limit. The dashed lines divide the space in regions where entry is
either decient (kw > k) or excessive (kw < k). Clearly, entry can be excessive or decient
depending on (v; k). The value of k can be interpreted as an indicator of the degree of
industry penetration in the market. The higher is k, the greater is product availability, and
the greater the fraction of consumers who obtain the good in either monopolistic competition
or a socially optimal allocation. In each of the four regions, entry has a business-stealing
and a consumer surplus e¤ect. The busines-stealing e¤ect refers to the fact that a part
of the prots of a new entrant is at the expense of incumbents, and therefore does not
contribute to social welfare. The consumer surplus e¤ect aries from market expansion
and improved matching of consumers to possible varieties. Entry is excessive when the
business stealing e¤ect dominates the consumer surplus e¤ect, and conversely (Mankiw and
Whinston, 1986).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 also shows that entry is decient in Region I when v is su¢ ciently high and a pure
strategy equilibrium exists. In this region, price is independent of v. Consequently, the
consumer surplus e¤ect dominates when v is large, and thus entry is decient; the opposite
is true when v is small. In the other regions, prices increase with v, eroding the consumer
surplus e¤ect. Consequently, when k is high in Regions II-IV, the business stealing e¤ect
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dominates and entry is excessive; when k is small, the business stealing e¤ect is small, and
entry is decient due to the dominating consumer surplus e¤ect.
We next further compare the number of rms at the free entry equilibrium and the second-
best outcome in the limit. In a second-best outcome, the social planner can choose entry
but not prices. For Regions I and II, the number of rms is the same at the second-best
and the rst-best outcomes. For Regions III and IV, welfare under the second-best outcome
is ~W (n) dened by equation (11) in Section 4. Letting n = kN; N ! 1; and assuming













  F  in Region IV :
Let ks denote the second-best level of product variety that maximizes this function. Note,
however that F = R(v; k) in a zero-prot equilibrium. Therefore, for a given v, we can
relate ks to the equilibrium value of k, and compare second-best and equilibrium varieties.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
A numerical comparison is summarized in Figure 3, which "blows up" Figure 2 on the re-
stricted domain v 2 [1; 2]. The diagram demarcates Regions IV and III and indicates where
k = kw by the dashed line as before. The diagram yields several interesting observations.
First, in Region IV, ks = 1 and equilibrium product variety always is decient relative to the
second-best. Second, the area of Region III in which entry is excessive (ks < k) is bounded
by the dotted lines and K (v) (which is the atter upward-slopping solid curve marking the
lower boundary of the X region); this region begins at about v = 53 and occupies the upper
corner of the diagram. Entry is decient in the rest of Region III below K (v). Finally, the
second-best and the rst-best varieties are not always directly comparable on the diagram,
but the second-best variety clearly exceeds the rst-best variety in Region IV and in part
of Region III between the dashed and dotted lines where kw < k < ks.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has developed and analyzed a new spatial model of product di¤erentiation.
By extending the classical Hotelling duopoly to an oligopoly with nonlocalized competition
and an arbitrary number of possible varieties and rms, the spokes model provides an
attractive new tool for oligopoly analysis, as well as a representation of spatial monopolistic
competition. In the spokes model, the symmetry between rms is maintained as new rms
enter the market, without the need to relocate the incumbents in the preference space.
Every brand (rm) competes directly with all other brands (rms), and both the number of
buyers and industry output depend on prices and the number of rms. A unique symmetric
(pure-strategy) equilibrium exists, and the nature of this equilibrium di¤ers for di¤erent
regions of the parameter space.
Analysis of the spokes model yields novel and interesting results on price and variety
under product di¤erentiation. In particular, an increase in the number of rms leads to
lower prices when consumers have a relatively high willingness-to-pay for preferred varieties,
but, surprisingly, to higher prices for lower consumer valuations. The entry of new rms
a¤ects consumers with the positive market expansion and matching e¤ects, in addition to
the possibly either positive or negative price e¤ect; and each rms prot can depend on the
number of rms non-monotonically within some range, rst decreasing and then increasing.
With free entry, the market may provide either too many or too few varieties, and there
can be multiple equilibria in the number of rms. Finally, when the number of rms
and of potential product varieties both approach innity, equilibrium price remains above
marginal cost, and thus the spokes model provides a representation of spatial monopolistic
competition.
As a tool for oligopoly analysis under nonlocalized competition, appropriate extensions of
the spokes model of product di¤erentiation have many possible applications in economics.
For instance, the model provides an attractive framework to study rms incentives to
o¤er multiple products and the competition between multi-product rms. In particular,
the model can address questions such as how market concentration a¤ects the provision
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of product varieties by multiproduct rms, and how horizontal or vertical mergers a¤ect
competition and consumers. The spokes model can also be used to study how market
structure a¤ects rmsinnovation incentives, for instance, whether a larger rm or rms in
more concentrated markets have greater incentives to innovate. Furthermore, the spokes
model is well suited for analyzing product choices by multiple rms, if rm locations on the
network are determined endogenously. For some of these applications it would be necessary
to modify the symmetric spokes model to introduce asymmetric rms.
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APPENDIX
The proofs for Proposition 1 and 2 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider in turn the four regions of parameter values. For
each region, we construct a symmetric equilibrium where the equilibrium price satises a
unique property that can hold only in the assumed region of parameter values, and any
other price can be a symmetric equilibrium only in a di¤erent region of parameter values.
The (symmetric) equilibrium is thus also unique.
Region I: Suppose that for this parameter region a symmetric equilibrium price satises
v > p + 1:





N   1 (1 + p




for prices pj in the neighborhood of p. The corresponding prot of rm j is j = pjqj ;
and, rm j0s rst-order condition for prot maximization is
qj   pj 1
N
n  1
N   1 = 0:
Therefore, at a symmetric equilibrium,
p = 1 + 2
N   1
n  1 :
It is straightforward that the second-order condition is satised and that p is a local
maximum. Firm j0s output and prot at the proposed equilibrium are
q =
2N   n  1
(N   1)N ; 
 =
(2N   n  1)2
(n  1) (N   1)N :
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The requirement that v > p + 1 is satised if and only if v > N 1n 1 2:
Finally, it is necessary to verify that a rm has no incentive to deviate globally. At the
candidate equilibrium, the second-order condition is satised for pj  p+1. Furthermore,
for v  1  pj > p + 1; demand is perfectly inelastic and prot is increasing in pj , and, for
pj  v   1, rm j0s prots are declining if v  2. Therefore, the possibly most protable
deviation is pj = v   1, the prots from which are  = (v   1)N nN 1 2N : The deviation is not
protable if   , i.e.




 (2N   n  1)
2
(n  1) (N   1)N ;
which holds if and only if
v  1 + (2N   n  1)
2





2N   n  1
N   n  v(N;n):
Thus p = 1 + 2N 1n 1 is indeed a symmetric equilibrium in Region I, and it is the only
symmetric equilibrium with the property that v > p + 1.
Region II : Suppose that for this parameter region a symmetric equilibrium price satises
















+ N nN 1 (v   pj)
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if pj is slightly below v   1
:
In other words, the demand for rm j has a kink at pj = v   t:




































(v   2)  0;






































which holds if and only if v  2N 1n 1 :Therefore p is a local maximum. To show that p is
also globally optimal, it su¢ ces if rm j cannot benet from any deviation to pj < v 1: But
since the second-order condition is satised for pj < v   1 (any kink of the prot function
makes it more concave); no global deviation can be protable.
Thus p = v   1 is indeed a symmetric equilibrium in Region II.
Region III : Suppose that the symmetric equilibrium price p is such that
1
2

































The rst-order condition for rm j is


















N   1 +
N   n
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N   1 +
N   n
N   1 v  
4N   3n  1




2 (N   n) v + (n  1)
4N   3n  1 ;
and p is a local maximum since the second order condition is satised at p. Furthermore,
since
v   p = v   n  1
4N   3n  1  
2 (N   n)
4N   3n  1v
=

1  2 (N   n)
4N   3n  1

v   n  1
4N   3n  1 =

2N   n  1
4N   3n  1
 
v   n  1




2N   n  1






2N   n  1  
n  1








v   p = v   2 (N   n) v + (n  1)
4N   3n  1
=
v (2N   n  1)  (n  1)
4N   3n  1 <
2 (2N   n  1)  (n  1)
4N   3n  1 = 1;
p indeed satises 12 < v   p < 1: Finally, to verify that p is also globally optimal, notice
that, since v 1 < p < v  12 ; it su¢ ces if any deviation to any p < p cannot be protable.
But since the second-order condition is satised for p < p; no global deviation can be
protable. Thus p is indeed a symmetric equilibrium in Region III.



















N 1 (v   pj) if p is slightly below p
:
In order for pto be an equilibrium, a slight increase of pj at p should not increase prot,
i.e.













which holds if and only if v  1:Also, a slight decrease of pj at p should not increase prot,
i.e.













































which holds if and only if v  12 + N 12N n 1 :Therefore, p is a local optimum for rm j; and,
since the second-order condition is satised for both p < v   12 and p > v   12 ; it is also a
global optimum.
To prove that the equilibrium is unique, suppose that there is another symmetric equi-
librium, ~p; in some region, say Region I. Then v  ~p + 1: If v   ~p = 1; then ~p can be a
symmetric equilibrium only in Region II; if 12 < v   ~p < 1; then ~p can be a symmetric
equilibrium only in Region III; and if 12 = v   ~p; then ~p can be a symmetric equilibrium
only in Region IV. This is a contradiction. Thus there is no other symmetric equilibrium
in Region I. The arguments for the other regions are similar. Q.E.D.
32
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume 2  v  v(N;n). Then (i) n1  2 and n2  2; (ii) if fN  1; then
n1  N and n2  N ; and (iii) if 1 < fN; then n1 < N:
Proof. (i) First, since 12 < fN  2N 3N 1 (v   1); we have
n2   2 = 2N   3  fN (N   1)
v   1  2N   3  (2N   3) = 0:
Thus if fN is su¢ ciently large, the equilibrium will be in Region II. Hence
f^N =
2 (v   1)2
v
 2N   3
N   1 (v   1);
and it follows that v  2 (N   1) :
Next, since
p
fN (fN + 8)  fN increases in fN; and fN  f^N = 2(v 1)2v in Region I;
we have
n1   2 = 2N   3  N   1
2
p
fN (fN + 8)  fN

 2N   3  N   1
2
0@
vuut2 (v   1)2
v
 
















2 (N   1)  v
v
 0:
(ii) If fN  1;
n1 = 2N   1  N   1
2
p
fN (fN + 8)  fN

 2N   1  N   1
2
p
(1 + 8)  1

= 2N   1  (N   1) = N;
and
n2 = 2N   1  fN (N   1)
v   1  2N   1 
(N   1)
v   1  2N   1  (N   1) = N:
(iii) If 1 < fN;
n1 = 2N   1  N   1
2
p
fN (fN + 8)  fN

< 2N   1  N   1
2
p





Note that f^N = 2(v 1)
2
v  1. We can now provide a complete characterization of the
equilibrium number(s) of rms. First, if 12 < fN  1; then n1 = n2 = N from Part (ii) of
Lemma 1: Thus n = N rms will enter the market and earn non-negative prots. This is
the only equilibrium since no additional rm can enter due to the constraint that n  N:
Next, if 1N < f  f^ ; we have
n1  n^ and thus 2N   1
n1   1  v:
Therefore n = [n1] ; and, n1 < N from part (iii) of Lemma 1. Finally, if f > f^; we have
n2 < n^ and thus 2
N   1
n2   1 > v:


































Price as a function of value
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